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MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY TO VICTIMS OF HANDGUN
CRIME: A COMMON-LAW APPROACH
INTRODUCTION
On March 30, 1981, during an attempt to assassinate President
Reagan, James Brady, the President's press secretary, was shot and
seriously injured. Mr. Brady has filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia charging the handgun manufac-
turer with common-law liability based on theories of negligence,'
strict products liability,2 and engaging in an abnormally dangerous
activity. 3 The gravamen of the complaint is that the manufacturer
placed an inexpensive, easily concealable handgun into the stream of
commerce with actual or constructive knowledge that such guns are
the preferred weapon of criminals and are ill-suited for legitimate
use.4 This suit is one of a growing number of personal injury suits that
seek to impose common-law liability on manufacturers of handguns
used in crime.5
1. First Amended Complaint for Damages, Brady v. Hinckley, No. 82-0549, at
4-10 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 1982). For a plaintiff to establish a cause of action in negli-
gence, he must prove that: 1) the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff; 2)
the defendant breached that duty; 3) the breach was the cause in fact and proximate
cause of the injury; and 4) the plaintiff suffered actual loss or damage as a result of
the injury. See Ono v. Applegate, 612 P.2d 533, 538-39 (Hawaii 1980); Christians v.
Homestake Enters., 101 Wis. 2d 25, 32, 303 N.W.2d 608, 611 (1981); W. Prosser,
Handbook of the Law of Torts § 30, at 143-44 (4th ed. 1971); Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 281 (1965).
2. First Amended Complaint for Damages, Brady v. Hinckley, No. 82-0549, at
10-11 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 1982). A seller is strictly liable in tort if it "sells any product in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous" to another and "physical harm was
thereby caused" to the plaintiff. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965); accord
Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1354 (M.D.Pa. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1335 (3d
Cir. 1979); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 459, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967).
3. First Amended Complaint for Damages, Brady v. Hinckley, No. 82-0549, at
11-12 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 1982). If an activity is found to be abnormally dangerous, the
defendant is held liable "although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the
harm." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 & comment d (1965); accord Yukon
Equip., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1208-09 (Alaska 1978). This
Note does not apply this theory to handgun design and marketing because unlike
those activities that have been characterized as abnormally dangerous, the dangers
arising in this context can be avoided if the manufacturer exercises reasonable care.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520(c) (1965)(danger of abnormally dangerous
activity cannot be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care).
4. First Amended Complaint for Damages, Brady v. Hinckley, No. 82-0549, at
4-5, 10, 11 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 1982).
5. E.g., Kelly v. R.G. Indus., No. 60-323 (Montgomery County Cir. Ct., Md.),
discussed in Lauter, Personal Injury Bar Takes New Aim at Guns, 4 Nat'l L.J. 4, 4
(Apr. 5, 1982); Riordan v. Interarms Ltd., No. 81-L-27,923 (Cook County Cir. Ct.,
Ill.), discussed in Tybor, Victim's Widow Sues Over Gun Sale, 4 Nat'l L.J. 30, 30
(Dec. 21, 1981); see also Suits Target Handgun Makers, 5 Nat'l L.J. 1, 1 (Nov. 29,
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The suggestion that handguns are ideally suited to criminal use
predates the Brady complaint. 6 Handguns in circulation 7 account for
only about 20 to 25% of all firearms,8 but they are used in the
majority of crimes committed with firearms. 9 They are used in at least
49 % of all homicides.10
1982); Warning: Dangerous To Your Health, CBS 60 Minutes, Oct. 24, 1982, at 7
(transcript). This Note focuses on manufacturers' liability for criminal misuse of
handguns. For an examination of the larger problem of manufacturer and supplier
liability for other kinds of handgun misuse, see Turley, Manufacturers' and Suppliers'
Liability to Handgun Victims, 10 N. Ky. L. Rev. 41 (1982).
6. Cook, The Effect of Gun Availability on Violent Crime Patterns, 455 Annals
63, 68, 78 (May 1981); Cox Newspapers, Washington Bureau, The Snub Nosed
Killers: Handguns in America, at 3, 4, 8 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Snub Nosed
Killers]; see Progress Report of the Nat'l Comm'n on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence, at A-34, Jan. 9, 1969 (weapon most often used in criminal assualts).
7. See Wright, Public Opinion and Gun Control: A Comparison of Results
From Two Recent National Surveys, 455 Annals 24, 27 (May 1981) (conservative
estimate of 31 million in 1978); Oversight of 1968 Gun Control Act- The Escalating
Rate of Handgun Violence: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile
Deliquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 664 (1975)
(Department of Justice estimate, 1974: 40,142,777) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
Handgun Violence]. This figure is increasing at an approximate rate of 10 % a year.
To Amend the Gun Control Act of 1968 to Prohibit Sale of "Saturday Night Special"
Handguns: Hearings on S. 2507 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delin-
quency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1971)
(statement of Lloyd Cutler, Former Executive Director, National Commission on
Causes & Prevention of Violence)[hereinafter cited as Hearings on Saturday Night
Specials].
8. Fields, Handgun Prohibition and Social Necessity, 23 St. Louis U.L.J. 35, 38
(1979) (extrapolating from FBI Uniform Crime Reports for 1974-1976); see Staff
Report to the Nat'l Comm'n on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Firearms and
Violence in American Life 6 (1969) (estimating 24 million handguns, 90 million total
firearms) [hereinafter cited as Staff Report].
9. Staff Report, supra note 8, at 49 (76%: homicide; 86%: assault; 96%:
robbery); see Fields, supra note 8, at 38.
10. FBI, Uniform Crime Reports 12 (1982) (1981-50%); FBI, Uniform Crime
Reports 12 (1979) (1978-49%); Hearings on Saturday Night Specials, supra note 7, at
69 (statement of Lloyd Cutler) (1967-63%). Seventy-six percent of all firearms used
in homicides are handguns. Id. at 46 (statement of Edmund G. Brown, Chairman,
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws). In Cleveland in 1970,
72% of all homicides were committed with handguns. Id. at 292 (testimony of Lt.
Ralph Joyce, Commanding Officer, Cleveland Homicide Bureau). Significantly,
more than 70 % of policemen murdered in the line of duty are killed with handguns.
See Hearings on Handgun Violence, supra note 7, at 533 (testimony of Edward H.
Levi, United States Attorney General); Hearings on Saturday Night Specials, supra
note 7, at 169 (testimony of John Lindsay, Mayor, New York City). While the
number of victims of handgun crime is relatively easy to determine, the true cost, to
victims and society, is elusive. It has been estimated that $500 million is spent
annually on treatment of gunshot wounds. Fields, supra note 8, at 35. The effect of
the fear caused by the pervasive threat of criminal handgun violence cannot be
measured. See Wright, supra note 7, at 29.
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Current gun control legislation has not been effective in reducing
handgun violence." Therefore, it is particularly appropriate in this
context for courts to supplement statutory duties with those imposed
by the common law.12 Nonetheless, no court to date has determined
that the likelihood of criminal handgun misuse resulting from a manu-
facturer's unreasonable product design and marketing may, in some
circumstances, provide a basis in negligence and strict products liabil-
ity for finding a breach of its common-law duty to provide reasonably
safe products.' 3
Part I of this Note discusses the interrelationship of handgun manu-
facturers' and dealers' statutory and common-law duties and suggests
that tort law may be an effective means of reducing criminal misuse of
handguns. Part II proposes three ways in which a breach of a hand-
gun manufacturer's common-law duties may be established. In addi-
tion, it argues that criminal misuse in these situations is foreseeable
and that the manufacturer should not be relieved of liability for
resulting injuries. Part III analyzes the policies supporting liability in
suitable cases. This Note concludes that in proper circumstances, a
finding of liability is not only appropriate but that a failure to so find
may run counter to the policies underlying products liability law and
afford handgun manufacturers an unwarranted immunity from its
application.
11. See Hearings on Saturday Night Specials, supra note 7, at 174 (statement of
Patrick Murphy, Police Commissioner, New York City); Institute for Legislative
Action, National Rifle Ass'n, The District's Handgun Ban, Report from Wash., Aug.
5, 1982, at 7, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as The District's Handgun Ban].
12. See Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1085 (D.C. 1976); Rucker v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 77 Ill. 2d 434, 440, 396 N.E.2d 534, 537 (1979); Mahr v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 72 Ill. App. 3d 540, 561, 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1229 (1979); Michael v.
Warner/Chilcott, 91 N.M. 651, 654, 579 P.2d 183, 186 (Ct. App. 1978); Sherman v.
M. Lowenstein & Sons, 28 A.D.2d 922, 922, 282 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143-44 (1967).
13. In analogous cases, some courts have held that there may be a basis for tort
liability. Cf. Decker v. Gibson Prods. Co., 679 F.2d 212 (11th Cir. 1982) (handgun
dealer's illegal sale may be negligence); Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 593 F.2d
526 (3d Cir. 1979) (handgun dealer's sale in violation of Delaware statute constitutes
negligence per se); Franco v. Bunyard, 261 Ark. 144, 547 S.W.2d 91, cert. denied,
434 U.S. 835 (1977) (handgun dealer's sale in violation of federal statute is evidence
of negligence); Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977) (slingshot
manufacturer liable for improperly marketing product); McMillen v. Steele, 275 Pa.
584, 119 A. 721 (1923) (handgun dealer's sale in violation of Pennsylvania statute
constitutes negligence); Olson v. Ratzel, 89 Wis. 2d 227, 278 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App.
1979) (dealer's illegal handgun sale may be negligence). But cf. Bennet v. Cincinnati
Checker Cab Co., 353 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D. Ky. 1973) (firearms importer not liable
for illegal sale because criminal misuse not foreseeable); Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev.
Corp., 647 P.2d 713 (Hawaii 1982) (firearms dealer not liable for illegal sale because
criminal misuse not foreseeable).
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I. INTERRELATIONSHIP OF STATUTE AND COMMON LAW
IN REDUCING CRIMINAL MISUSE OF HANDGUNS
A. Statutory Duties
The role that manufacturers should play in reducing criminal hand-
gun misuse is defined in part by the duties imposed by statute. Fed-
eral 14 and state governments15 regulate the manufacture, shipment
and sale of firearms in an attempt to reduce the availability of hand-
guns to criminals.1 6 These efforts to reduce criminal misuse rely pri-
marily on purchaser eligibility requirements.17
Title I of the Gun Control Act of 196818 requires that all firearm
manufacturers and dealers19 be licensed by the federal government.20
Further, a manufacturer or dealer may be criminally liable for the
sale of a firearm to certain classes of purchasers, such as convicted
felons21 or adjudicated mental defectives,22 but only if it knows or has
reasonable cause to believe that the purchaser is a member of a
proscribed class. 23 Absent suspicious circumstances, a dealer fulfills
this statutory duty if he receives a certification of eligibility signed by
the purchaser and some customary form of identification, such as a
driver's license.24 He also must record the transaction,25 including the
14. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
15. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 83-1 to -16.3 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp.
1982-1983); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 40:1751-:1804 (West 1977); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit.
18, §§ 6101-6120 (Purdon 1973 & Supp. 1982-1983). Some municipalities also regu-
late firearm sales. See, e.g., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Department of
the Treasury, State Laws and Published Ordinances 24 (1979) (Los Angeles); id. at
70-71 (Chicago); id. at 179-81 (New York City).
16. See, e.g., Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-351, § 901, 82 Stat. 197, 225-26 (1968) (Findings and Declarations to Gun Control
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38,
§ 83-1 (Smith-Hurd 1977).
17. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 83-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1977); N.Y. Penal
Law § 400.00 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1982-1983); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 6111
(Purdon 1973).
18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
19. Id. § 921(a)(11)(A) (defining a dealer as one "engaged in the business of
selling firearms").
20. Id. § 922(a)(1) (requiring license); id. § 923(a) (license must be obtained from
federal government).
21. Id. § 922(h)(1).
22. Id. § 922(h)(4). There are several other proscribed classes in this statute. See,
e.g., id. § 922(h)(2) (fugitive from justice); id. § 922(h)(3) (drug addict); id.
§ 922(b)(1) (persons below the age of 18 for rifles and shotguns, below the age of 21
for all other firearms).
23. Id. § 922(b)(1), (d).
24. 27 C.F.R. § 178.124(c) (1982).
25. Id. § 178.124(a).
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name of the purchaser and serial number of the gun,2 6 and furnish this
information to the federal government upon request.2 7
Section 927 of the Gun Control Act of 196828 embodies clear con-
gressional intent to allow state regulation of the subject matter regu-
lated by the Act as long as it is not in "direct and positive" conflict
with the federal statute.29 Generally, most states that have imposed
additional requirements merely increase the prerequisites for pur-
chaser eligibility" rather than impose affirmative duties on the manu-
facturer or the dealer.3 1 State regulatory approaches can be divided
into three general categories.32 Some states require the purchaser to
possess a license issued by the state as a prerequisite to handgun
purchases.3 3 Some states require the purchaser to obtain a permit for
26. Id. § 178.124(c).
27. Id. § 178.126(a).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 927 (1976).
29. Id.
30. See Cook & Blose, State Programs for Screening Handgun Buyers, 455 Annals
80, 84-85 (May 1981); see, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-33(g) (1981); Ill. Ann. Stat.
ch. 38, § 83-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1977); N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00 (McKinney 1980 &
Supp. 1982-1983).
Some municipal ordinances impose stricter controls than either the state or federal
governments. New York City, for example, grants its licensing officer broad discre-
tion to deny handgun permits. See New York City Charter & Admin. Code Ann. ch.
18, tit. A, § 436-5.0(1) (Williams 1976) (Commissioner has discretionary authority
granted by N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(1) (McKinney 1980)); N.Y. Penal Law
§ 400.00(6) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983) (New York City is the only municipality in
the state that has, under most circumstances, the right to refuse to honor permits
issued by other state licensing authorities). Recently, the city of Morton Grove,
Illinois went even further and imposed a ban on the possession and sale of handguns.
Morton Grove, Ill., Ordinance No. 81-11 (June 8, 1981) (handgun possession was still
allowed for peace officers, prison officials, armed forces, the national guard, licensed
gun clubs and licensed gun collectors), upheld in Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove,
532 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff'd, Nos. 82-1045, 82-1076, 82-1132 (7th
Cir. Dec. 6, 1982); see Tybor, U.S. Judge Upholds City Ordinance Banning Sale,
Possession of Handguns, 4 Nat'i L.J. 3 (Jan. 11, 1982); Note, Banning Handguns:
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove and the Second Amendment, 60 Wash. U.L.Q.
1087 (1982).
31. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 29-27 to -38a (1981); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38,
§§ 83-1 to -16.3 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1982-1983); N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00
(McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1982-1983). Many states do not prescribe significant pre-
requisites for handgun purchases. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-3101 to -3175
(1977 & Supp. 1981) (no prerequisite to purchase); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-26-101 to
-27-104 (1978) (dealer must only keep record of sale); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21,
§§ 1271-1289.22 (West 1958 & Supp. 1982-1983) (no prerequisite to purchase).
Mississippi and New Hampshire, although prescribing no prerequisites to handgun
purchase, require that the sale of a handgun be reported to authorities. Miss. Code
Ann. § 45-9-1 (1972); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 159:9 (1977).
32. Cook & Blose, supra note 30, at 85.
33. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 83-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1977); Iowa Code
Ann. §§ 724.15 -.16 (West 1979); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 140, § 129B (Michie/Law.
Co-op. 1981).
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the purchase of each handgun.3 4 Other states require the dealer to
provide written notification to law enforcement authorities of the
prospective purchaser's identity and prescribe a waiting period before
purchase.3 - Many of the states that have adopted one of these three
regulatory approaches also require that a sale be registered with au-
thorities upon completion.3 6
B. Civil Liability
The Kennedy-Rodino Handgun Crime Control Act of 1983, 37 pro-
posed to amend the Gun Control Act of 1968, 3 would increase federal
government regulation of handgun manufacturers and dealers. For
example, the bill would ban the sale of Saturday Night Specials; 39
impose a twenty-one day waiting period, during which the eligibility
of a prospective purchaser could be ascertained by law enforcement
34. See, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 134-3 (Supp. 1981); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 40:1784 (West 1977); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 140, § 131A (Michie/Law. Co-op.
1981); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 28.422 (West 1981); N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00
(McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1982-1983); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-402, -409.1 (1981). A
permit differs from a license in that a permit must be obtained prior to each handgun
purchase, while possession of a license allows handgun purchases over a period of
time. Cook & Blose, supra note 30, at 85. Compare Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 83-2(a)
(Smith-Hurd 1977) (license) with Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 134-3 (Supp. 1981)(permit).
35. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-11-77 (1978)(48 hours); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-33
(1981)(2 weeks); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-23-4.1-7(a) (Burns 1979) (7 days); Md. Crim.
Law Code Ann. § 442(b)(1982) (same); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 6111 (Purdon 1973)
(48 hours); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-35 (1981) (72 hours); S.D. Codified Laws Ann.
§ 23-7-9 (1979) (48 hours); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-6-1704(c) (1982) (15 days).
36. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-11-77 (1978); Cal. Penal Code § 12,076(b) (West
1982); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 134-2 (Supp. 1981); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1783 (West
1977); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 140, § 123 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 28.422(2) (West 1981); Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.420(3) (1981); S.D.
Codified Laws Ann. § 23-7-19 (1979). Rhode Island is unique in that it forbids the
state to keep a central registry even though its statutes require notification and
prescribe a waiting period. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-41 (1981). However, the state
does require the dealer to maintain a record of all sales. Id. § 11-47-40.
37. S. 511, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. S1315-20 (daily ed., Feb. 17,
1983).
38. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
39. S. 511, § 105, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong Rec. S1318 (daily ed. Feb, 17,
1983). These weapons are generally described as easily concealable, inexpensive and
poorly made. Hearings on Saturday Night Specials, supra note 7, at 132 (testimony of
Eugene T. Rossides, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury); id. at 281 (testimony of
John Nichols, Commissioner of Police, Detroit); id. at 330-31 (testimony of Harold
A. Serr, Retired Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms); Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Project Identification, A Study of Handguns Used in
Crime (1976), reprinted in Hearings on Handgun Violence, supra note 7, at 366-67.
For a discussion of a manufacturer's common-law liability for selling Saturday Night
Specials, see infra pt. II(A)(2)(c).
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authorities; 40 require all thefts to be reported to authorities; 41 and
require importers and manufacturers to maintain a record of each
handgun sale.42
The bill also expressly provides for a civil cause of action for injuries
resulting from a negligent handgun sale under the statute.43 Such a
provision is necessary to afford a plaintiff recovery from a manufac-
turer or dealer under federal law because courts have refused to imply
a cause of action against a dealer under the Gun Control Act of 196844
for injuries resulting from criminal misuse of handguns. 45 These courts
have determined that Congress intended to protect the general public
through administrative enforcement46 of this statute rather than pro-
vide retrospective remedial relief to victims of handgun crime. 47
One court, however, has held that a dealer's violation of the Gun
Control Act of 196848 can be evidence of negligence under state com-
mon law.49 Moreover, a dealer's violation of state gun control laws has
been determined to constitute negligence per se.50 While no court has
40. Id. § 103(a), 129 Cong. Rec. at S1317.
41. Id. § 102(n), 129 Cong. Rec. at 51316.
42. Id. § 104(j), 129 Cong. Rec. at S1318 (proposed amendment to 18 U.S.C.
§ 923(g) (2)-(3) (1976)).
43. Id. § 106(d), 129 Cong. Rec. at S1319 (proposed amendment to § 924(e)).
44. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
45. Decker v. Gibson Prods. Co., 505 F. Supp. 34, 36 (M.D. Ga. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds, 679 F.2d 212 (l1th Cir. 1982); see Olson v. Ratzel, 89 Wis. 2d. 227,
249-50, 278 N.W.2d 238, 248-49 (1979); cf. Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev. Corp., 647
P.2d 713, 720 (Hawaii 1982) (firearm). No court to date has determined whether a
plaintiff has an implied private right of action against a manufacturer under the Act.
46. Decker v. Gibson Prods. Co., 505 F. Supp. 34, 36 (M.D. Ga. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds, 679 F.2d 212 (11th Cir. 1982); Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev. Corp.,
647 P.2d 713, 720 (Hawaii 1982); see Olson v. Ratzel, 89 Wis. 2d 227, 249-50, 278
N.W.2d 238, 248-49 (1979).
47. Decker v. Gibson Prods. Co., 505 F. Supp. 34, 36 (M.D.Ga. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds, 679 F.2d 212 (11th Cir. 1982); Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev. Corp.,
647 P.2d 713, 720 (Hawaii 1982).
48. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
49. Franco v. Bunyard, 261 Ark. 144, 147, 547 S.W.2d 91, 93, cert. denied, 434
U.S. 835 (1977); see Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 593 F.2d 526, 532 (3d Cir.
1979)(dictum).
50. Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 593 F.2d 526, 530 (3d Cir. 1979); see
McMillen v. Steele, 275 Pa. 584, 587, 119 A. 721, 722 (1923). But see Hulsman v.
Hemmeter Dev. Corp., 647 P.2d 713, 719-20 (Hawaii 1982). The violation of certain
statutes designed to protect a class of which plaintiff is a member from the type of
harm in question is, in the majority of jurisdictions, negligence per se, if a causal
relationship can be shown between the violation and the injury. Enis v. Ba-Call
Bldg. Corp., 639 F.2d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 1980); Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
593 F.2d 526, 529-30 (3d Cir. 1979); Macey v. United States, 454 F. Supp. 684, 690
(D. Alaska 1978); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (1965). In a minority of
jurisdictions, violation of statute is admissible on the question of negligence but is not
dispositive. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 36, at 201; see, e.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v.
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addressed the issue, handgun manufacturers' failure to fulfill their
statutory duties may provide a similar basis of common-law civil
liability.."
Full compliance with these statutory duties, although evidence of
the reasonableness of a manufacturer's design and marketing, does not
fulfill a manufacturer's common-law duty or preclude its civil liabil-
ity52 if it is determined that the applicable statutory duties are not
sufficient to prevent injury.53 For example, a drug manufacturer in
full compliance with Food and Drug Administration warning require-
ments has been held civilly liable for failure to fulfill the stricter duty
to warn imposed by the common law.5 4
The Gun Control Act of 1968 and existing state gun control laws do
not adequately protect the public from criminal misuse of handguns.55
Jones Constr. Co., 325 F.2d 605, 612 (8th Cir. 1963); Whitt v. Dyan, 20 Md. App.
148, 154-55, 315 A.2d 122, 126-27 (1974); Horbal v. McNeil, 66 N.J. 99, 103-04, 328
A.2d 604, 606-07 (1974). However, a defendant may avoid liability by showing that
his conduct was unavoidable and therefore reasonable. See, e.g., Baumann v. Potts,
82 Mich. App. 225, 229-30, 266 N.W.2d 766, 768-69 (1978); Gordon v. Hurtado, 96
Nev. 375, 379-80, 609 P.2d 327, 329 (1980). See generally Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 288A (1965). It has been held that the intervening criminal misuse of a
handgun sold in violation of statute was unforeseeable and therefore the defendant
was not liable. Robinson v. Howard Bros. of Jackson, Inc., 372 So. 2d 1074, 1076
(Miss. 1979). For a discussion of proving proximate cause in the context of criminal
handgun misuse, see infra pt. II(B)(2).
51. Cf. Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Enutsler, 276 F.2d 455, 461 (4th Cir.
1960) (manufacturer's misbranding of surgical instrument in violation of Federal
Food & Drug Act constitutes negligence per se); Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharmaceuti-
cal Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961, 964-65 (E.D. Wis. 1981)(contraceptive manufacturer's
failure to comply with FDA regulation constitutes negligence per se).
52. Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1084-85 (D.C. 1976); Rucker v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 77 Ill. 2d 434, 440, 396 N.E.2d 534, 537 (1979); Sherman v. M.
Lowenstein & Sons, 28 A.D.2d 922, 922, 282 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143-44 (1967). But see
Corey v. Kaufman & Chernick, Inc., 70 R.I. 27, 30, 36 A.2d 103, 105 (1944)(state
statute indicates legislative intent to allow sale of guns to all not proscribed).
53. See Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1085 (D.C. 1976); Mahr v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 72 II. App. 3d 540, 561, 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1229 (1979); Michael
v. Warner/Chilcott, 91 N.M. 651, 654, 579 P.2d 183, 186 (Ct. App. 1978).
54. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 64-65, 507 P.2d 653, 661, 107
Cal. Rptr. 45, 53 (1973).
55. In 1968, firearms were used in over 8900 murders, 65,000 assaults and 99,000
robberies. See FBI, Uniform Crime Reports 1 (1969). Ten years later, firearms were
used in over 11,800 murders, 125,000 assaults and 170,200 robberies. See FBI,
Uniform Crime Reports 13, 19, 21 (1979).
Gun control advocates and their opponents disagree as to the effectiveness of gun
control legislation, see Hearings on Saturday Night Specials, supra note 7, at 188-89
(conversation between John Lindsay, Mayor of New York City, and Senator Hruska),
but both groups agree that existing regulation has failed to reduce significantly
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In light of the inadequacies of these existing statutes and the difficulty
in enacting more effective legislation,56 it is particularly appropriate
that courts, in addressing the problem of criminal handgun misuse,
exercise their long-recognized power to supplement statutory duties
with those imposed by the common law.57
handgun violence nationwide. See Hearings on Saturday Night Specials, supra note
7, at 174 (statement of Patrick Murphy, Police Commissioner, New York City); The
District's Handgun Ban, supra note 11, at 7. Consequently, proponents of gun
control favor comprehensive federal legislation that would provide uniform control.
See Hearings on Saturday Night Specials, supra note 7, at 177 (statement of Patrick
Murphy, Police Commissioner, New York City); National Coalition to Ban Hand-
guns, 20 Questions and Answers, question 17 (information pamphlet) [hereinafter
cited as National Coalition to Ban Handguns]. Opponents seek not only to prevent
passage of new legislation but also to repeal many existing statutes. Firearms Legisla-
tion: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. [Part 8] 2854-55, 2859-60 (1975) (testimony of Harlon Carter,
Executive Director, Institute for Legislative Action, National Rifle Association, and
Richard Corrigan, Director, Federal Affairs Division, Institute for Legislative
Action, National Rifle Association) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Firearms Legis-
lation]. They argue that these laws divert "scarce police, court and penal resources"
without reducing crime. Institute for Legislative Action, National Rifle Ass'n, Press
Release 10 (Mar. 4, 1982) (statement of Neal Knox, Executive Director, to Subcom-
mittee on Criminal Law of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary) [hereinafter cited
as National Rifle Association Press Release].
Opponents also assert that most gun control legislation is violative of the second
amendment provision against infringing the right to keep and bear arms. See Caplan,
Restoring the Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited, 5 Fordham Urb. L.J. 31,
52 (1976); Hays, The Right to Bear Arms, A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation, 2
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 381, 405-06 (1960); Note, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms; A
Necessary Constitutional Guarantee or an Outmoded Provision of the Bill of Rights?,
31 Alb. L. Rev. 74, 85 (1967). However, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its
position that the Constitution does not protect the right to bear firearms that do not
bear "some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regu-
lated militia." Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980)(quoting United
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)).
56. Cook & Blose, supra note 30, at 91; see Congressional Research Serv., Li-
brary of Cong., 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Report to the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
Federal Regulation of Firearms 15-17 (Comm. Print 1982) (no significant federal gun
control legislation has been passed since 1968). Even assuming the existence of a
consensus in favor of such legislation, opponents have proven to be effective in
blocking passage by lobbying. See Hearings on Firearms Legislation [Part 1], supra
note 55, at 4 (statement of Chairman Conyers).
57. See Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1085 (D.C. 1976); Rucker v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 77 Ill. 2d 434, 440, 396 N.E.2d 534, 537 (1979); Mahr v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 72 Ill. App. 3d 540, 561, 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1229 (1979); Michael v.
Warner/Chilcott, 91 N.M. 651, 654, 579 P.2d 183, 186 (Ct. App. 1978); Sherman v.
M. Lowenstein & Sons, 28 A.D.2d 922, 922, 282 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143-44 (1967).
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II. ESTABLISHING MANUFACTURERS' COMMON-LAW
LIABILITY FOR CRIMINAL MISUSE OF HANDGUNS
A. The Manufacturer's Common-Law Duty:
Reasonably Safe Design and Marketing
1. The Appropriate Standard
Under general negligence principles, a manufacturer has a duty to
design and market products reasonably safe for foreseeable uses.58
This duty arises because of the economic benefits the manufacturer
derives from the sale of the product59 and consumers' justified expecta-
tions of safety.60 By contrast, in strict products liability a manufac-
turer is liable when he sells products in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the public.6 1 The focus is on the condition of the
product rather than the conduct of the actor.62 Strict products liability
58. E.g., Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1274 (8th Cir.
1972) (duty to design reasonably safe product); Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425,
432, 254 N.W.2d 759, 762 (1977) (duty not to market to classes likely to misuse
product); see Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 360
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (duty to market products with adequate warnings); Smith v. Hobart
Mfg. Co., 185 F. Supp. 751, 753 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (duty to design reasonably safe
product), rev'd on other grounds, 302 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1962); Stevens v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 64, 507 P.2d 653, 661, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 53 (1973) (duty
to market products with adequate warnings). See generally 1 L. Frumer & M.
Friedman, Products Liability §§ 7.01, 8 (1982).
59. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 395 comment b (1965).
60. Id.
61. E.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 654 (1st Cir.
1981); Khoder v. AMF, Inc., 539 F.2d 1078, 1079 (5th Cir. 1976); Bair v. American
Motors Corp., 535 F.2d 249, 250 (3d Cir. 1976); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A (1965). Although the Restatement takes no position on whether this duty
extends beyond users and consumers, id. § 402A caveat, many courts have extended it
to bystanders. E.g., Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 586, 451
P.2d 84, 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 657 (1969); Herbert v. Brazzel, 403 So. 2d 1242, 1244
(La. 1981); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 335, 298 N.E.2d 622, 624, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461, 463 (1973); Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex.
1969); Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 260, 201 N.W.2d 825, 831-32 (1972); see
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 834 (1973).
A victim of criminal handgun misuse could also bring a cause of action against a
handgun manufacturer based on an implied warranty theory in many jurisdictions.
See 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 58, § 16.04[2][c] (discussing case law
extending manufacturers' implied warranty liability to bystanders); id. § 16.04[3][a]
(discussing U.C.C. § 2-318(b)-(c) alternatives extending manufacturers' liability to
bystanders). In most instances, however, application of the theories of implied
warranty and strict products liability to bystanders will be the same. See 2 L. Frumer
& M. Friedman, supra note 58, § 16A[4][a]; W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 98, at 656.
62. Bailey v. Boatland of Houston, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 805, 810 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979), rev'd on other grounds, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980); Kerns v. Engelke, 76 Ill.
2d 154, 161, 390 N.E.2d 859, 862 (1979); Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268
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was developed in part to place liability on the manufacturer because,
by marketing a product, it has assumed a special responsibility to the
public and should bear the costs of accidents as a cost of doing
business.6 3
In strict products liability, three broad classes of defects are recog-
nized: manufacturing, design, and marketing with inadequate warn-
ings and instructions.6 4 Manufacturing defects may be demonstrated
when a particular product does not perform as it was designed to
perform or fails to perform as other products of the same kind.65
Design defects may be established by showing that the entire product
line is unreasonably unsafe.66 For example, a product will be found
defective and thus unreasonably dangerous if its design fails to dis-
courage foreseeable misuse.6 7 Finally, an otherwise safe product may
be held defective if the manufacturer fails to provide warnings and
instructions that are necessary for its safe use.66
Although many courts purport to maintain the distinction between
negligence and strict products liability theories in actions based on
design or marketing defects, 9 both tests can best be understood as
N.W.2d 830, 835 (Iowa 1978); 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 58,
§ 16A[4][f][iv][A]; see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment g (1965).
63. E.g., Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1130 (1st Cir. 1978) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment c (1965)), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916
(1979); Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 107 n.4 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment c (1965)), vacated on other grounds,
609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979); Brown v. Link Belt Corp., 565 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th
Cir. 1977) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment c (1965)).
64. See 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 58, § 16A[4][f][i]. The term
"marketing" is used throughout this Note to include the concept of warnings and
instructions.
65. E.g., Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App. 579, 584, 398 A.2d
490, 495 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 286 Md. 714, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980); Roy
Matson Truck Lines v. Michelin Tire Corp., 277 N.W.2d 361, 361 (Minn. 1979);
Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Or. 587, 589, 575 P.2d 1383, 1384 (1978). See
generally 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 58, § 16A[4][f][iii].
66. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429, 573 P.2d 443, 454,
143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 (1978); Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 77 Ill. 2d 434, 437, 396
N.E.2d 534, 535-36 (1979); Azzarello v. Black Bros., 480 Pa. 547, 559, 391 A.2d
1020, 1027 (1978). See generally 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 58,
§ 16A[4][f][iv][D].
67. E.g., Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 362
(E.D.N.Y. 1972); Cobb v. Insured Lloyds, 387 So. 2d 13, 18 (La. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 394 So. 2d 615 (1980); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 163,
386 A.2d 816, 821 (1978).
68. E.g., Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368
(E.D.N.Y. 1972); Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1084 (D.C. 1976);
Freund v. Cellofilm Props., Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 242-43, 432 A.2d 925, 932 (1981). See
generally 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 58, § 16A[4[f][vi].
69. Freund v. Cellofilm Props., Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 239, 432 A.2d 925, 930-31
(1981); Bailey v. Boatland of Houston, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 805, 810 (Tex. Civ. App.
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inquiring whether the product's design and marketing are reasonably
safe.70 In negligence, this entails application of the general standard
requiring a manufacturer to exercise reasonable care in the design and
marketing of its product.7 1 In a strict products liability claim based on
a marketing defect, a similar reasonableness standard is ordinarily
used to determine if a product is unreasonably unsafe due to inade-
quate warnings and instructions. 72 For design defects, several strict
products liability tests have been suggested to determine if a product is
unreasonably unsafe. 73 The most commonly used inquires whether a
product's design meets the reasonable expectations of the ordinary
consumer.7 4 Another test, employing more specific criteria,7 5 balances
the risks and benefits of a challenged design to determine if the risk of
1979), rev'd on other grounds, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980); Kerns v. Engelke, 76 Ill.
2d 154, 161, 390 N.E.2d 859, 862 (1979); Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268
N.W.2d 830, 835 (Iowa 1978); Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 465, 525 P.2d 125,
129 (1974); 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 58, § 16A[4][f][iv][A]-[B];
id. § 16A[4][f][vi]; see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment g (1965);
Wade, supra note 61, at 834-35.
70. See Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 121 Ariz. 253, 259, 589 P.2d 896, 902
(1979); Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 640, 105 Cal. Rptr.
890, 895 (1973); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 576, 420 A.2d
1305, 1318 (Law Div. 1980); W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 99, at 659 n.72; Katz, The
Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. Cin. L. Rev. 587, 632
(1969); Wade, supra note 61, at 850.
71. See, e.g., Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 361
(E.D.N.Y. 1972); McLeod v. White Motor Corp., 399 N.E.2d 890, 891-92 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1980); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 385-86, 348 N.E.2d 571,
577, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121 (1976); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 395 & comment
b (1965).
72. E.g. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 992 (8th Cir. 1969);
Freund v. Cellofilm Props., Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 237, 432 A.2d 925, 929 (1981);
Rainbow v. Albert Elia Bldg. Co., 49 A.D.2d 250, 253, 373 N.Y.S.2d 928, 931
(1975). In order to be adequate, warnings and instructions must be reasonably
calculated to alert a person to the dangers of the product. Yarrow v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 163 (D.S.D. 1967), aff'd, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969); see
Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 72 Ill. App. 3d 540, 562, 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1229-30
(1979); Baker v. Saint Agnes Hosp., 70 A.D.2d 400, 406-07, 421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 85-86
(1979); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 198, 423 N.E.2d 831, 837
(1981).
73. See Davison, The Uncertain Search for a Design Defect Standard, 30 Am. U.
L. Rev. 643, 646 (1981).
74. Id. at 650. See generally Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective
Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1965).
75. Wade, supra note 61, at 837-38. Professor Wade suggests seven factors: 1)
utility of the product; 2) likelihood and seriousness of potential injury; 3) availability
of a substitute; 4) ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without
undue expense or destroying the product's usefulness; 5) user's ability to avoid dan-
ger; 6) user's anticipated awareness of danger; and 7) feasability of the manufacturer
spreading the risk of loss. Id.
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injury outweighs the design's utility. 76 Both tests, like the test for
improper marketing, require that the product be found unreasonably
unsafe. 77 Accordingly, this Note, in discussing possible theories for
establishing a handgun manufacturer's liability for criminal misuse of
handguns, generally focuses on whether the handgun design and mar-
keting are unreasonably unsafe.
2. Breach of the Manufacturer's Duty
Under either a negligence or strict products liability theory, a man-
ufacturer may have breached its duty to a person injured by criminal
handgun misuse if it sold guns that were unreasonably unsafe in
design or that were improperly marketed.7 8 Moreover, because of the
76. E.g., Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1356 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 591
F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1979); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 883 (Alaska
1979); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 236 (1978); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 177,
406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 495, 525
P.2d 1033, 1038 (1974).
77. See 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 58, § 16A[4][f][iv]; W. Prosser,
supra note 1, § 99, at 659 n.72. Thus, marketing and design defect claims establish-
ing that a product is unreasonably unsafe under either negligence or strict liability
will usually require the same proof. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 103, at 671; Wade,
supra note 61, at 836. But see Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 253, 201 N.W.2d
825, 827 (1972) (strict liability removes the need to prove specific acts of negligence).
Under either theory, the plaintiff is required to establish that 1) he has been injured
by the product; 2) the injury occurred because the product was defective; and 3) the
defect existed when the product left the defendant's possession. See W. Prosser, supra
note 1, § 103, at 671-72. A few courts have significantly changed the plaintiff's
burden of proof. In these jurisdictions, if the plaintiff shows that the product design
was the proximate cause of his injury, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that
the benefits of the design outweigh the risks. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Jeppesen & Co., 463 F. Supp. 94, 95 (D. Nev. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 642
F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981); Moorer v. Clayton Mfg. Corp., 128 Ariz. 565, 568, 627
P.2d 716, 719 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 866 (1981); Barker v. Lull Eng'g
Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978).
78. Cf. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 361
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (manufacturers of explosives liable for lack of adequate warnings
and instructions); Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 432, 254 N.W.2d 759, 762
(1977) (slingshot manufacturer liable for negligent marketing); Cepeda v. Cum-
berland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 180-81, 386 A.2d 816, 830 (1978) (machine manu-
facturer may be liable for design that was unsafe for foreseeable misuse), overruled
on other grounds, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 177, 406
A.2d 140, 153 (1979).
Of course, if the criminal misuse of a handgun results in the victim's death, the
procedural mechanism for recovering from the manufacturer is an action brought by
the personal representative of the decedent under a state wrongful death statute. S.
Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death §§ 1:9, 2:1, :9 (2d ed. 1975) (wrongful death
action will lie if decedent, had he lived, would have had a valid cause of action;
action includes strict products liability claims).
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inherent dangerousness of handguns, 79 the manufacturer has a special
responsibility to guard against risks that may result from a failure to
fulfill this common-law duty.80 This Note suggests that handgun man-
ufacturers may breach their duty in one of three ways: 1) failing to
warn and instruct a handgun dealer or purchaser adequately; 2)
negligently entrusting handguns to dealers or shippers; or 3) designing
a type of handgun known as Saturday Night Specials.
a. Warnings and Instructions
A manufacturer has a duty to provide adequate warnings and
instructions that are necessary to the safe use of its product.8' Al-
though in certain instances a regulatory duty to warn and instruct is
imposed, 2 compliance with these minimal duties does not ordinarily
fulfill the manufacturer's common-law duty.8 3
79. Folk v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 736, 740 (W.D.S.C.), rev'd on other
grounds, 199 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1952); Palmisano v. Ehrig, 171 N.J. Super. 310, 313,
408 A.2d 1083, 1084 (App. Div. 1979), cert. denied, 82 N.J. 827, 412 A.2d 793
(1980); Yusko v. Remizon, 199 Misc. 1116, 1118, 106 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (Columbia
County Ct. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 280 A.D. 637, 116 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1952).
The inherent dangerousness of firearms has been recognized since early common law.
See Oberer, The Deadly Weapon Doctrine-Common Law Origin, 75 Harv. L. Rev.
1565, 1573 n.43 (1962). The penal laws of several states distinguish firearms from
other weapons that are considered less dangerous. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 53a-3(6) (West Supp. 1982); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 500.080(4) (Supp. 1982); N.Y. Penal
Law § 10.00(12) (McKinney 1975). The inherent dangerousness of a product is one
factor to be considered in determining whether a defendant has acted as a reasonably
prudent person when dealing with a product, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 395
comment d (1965), although a product's inherent dangerousness is not necessary to
establish a cause of action against a manufacturer. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 395
comment d (1965).
80. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 298 comment b (1965); cf. Hall v. E.I.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (explosives
manufacturer); Palmisano v. Ehrig, 171 N.J. Super. 310, 313, 408 A.2d 1083, 1084
(App. Div. 1979) (firearms manufacturer), cert. denied, 82 N.J. 827, 412 A.2d 793
(1980); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928)
(dictum) (same); Wright, Civil Liability For Fire-Arms, 11 Can. B.J. 247, 248 (1968)
(firearms manufacturers' duty borders on strict liability).
81. E.g., Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1084 (D.C. 1976); Freund
v. Cellofilm Props., Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 242-43, 432 A.2d 925, 932 (1981); see Hall v.
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See
generally 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 58, § 8; 2 id. § 16A[4][f][vi]; W.
Prosser, supra note 1, § 99, at 661; id. § 96, at 646-49.
82. E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 203.20(b) (1982) (package inserts for prescription drugs);
id. § 369 (warnings for over-the-counter drugs).
83. See, e.g., Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 162-63 (D.S.D.
1967), alf'd, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d
51, 65, 507 P.2d 653, 661, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 53 (1973).
1983] HANDGUN MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY 785
A handgun manfacturer may breach its common-law duty to mar-
ket a product properly by failing to provide either adequate warnings
as to foreseeable dangers arising from misuse or adequate instructions
for safe use.8 4 First, a manufacturer may be found to have a duty to
warn dealers of the severe consequences resulting from a failure to
screen prospective purchasers adequately.85 Second, a manufacturer
owes a similar duty to warn handgun purchasers of the dangers of
improper use and storage, 8 and to instruct them in procedures to
prevent accidents and theft. 7 This latter duty to warn the consumer
falls most heavily on the manufacturer because it is in the best position
to recognize and cure such marketing defects88 as widespread dealer
failure to provide adequate warnings and instructions.8 9 In circum-
stances in which such dealer conduct is foreseeable, the intervening
84. Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 197, 423 N.E.2d 831, 836
(1981); Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 72 Ill. App. 3d 540, 569, 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1235
(1979); see Dosier v. Wilcox & Crittendon Co., 45 Cal. App. 3d 74, 80, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 135, 138 (1975). This duty extends to all foreseeable users and includes a duty
to warn of harm that can result from foreseeable misuse. Poland v. Beaird-Poulan,
483 F. Supp. 1256, 1263 (W.D. La. 1980); Davis v. Siloo Inc., 47 N.C. App. 237,
245, 267 S.E.2d 354, 359, cert. denied, 301 N.C. 234, 283 S.E.2d 131 (19801.
85. Cf. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65, 507 P.2d 653, 661, 107
Cal. Rptr. 45, 53 (1973) (drug manufacturers liable for failure to warn doctors about
dangers of prescribing product to users susceptible to dangerous side effects);
Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 286-88, 282 A.2d 206, 219-20 (1971) (same).
Appropriate warnings and instructions to shippers and dealers regarding theft avoid-
ance may also be necessary. See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
86. Cf. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 361
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (manufacturers, and those who use or store explosives, must use
degree of care commensurate with great danger); Cobb v. Insured Lloyds, 387 So. 2d
13, 19 (La. Ct. App.) (handgun manufacturer liable for failure to warn adequately
of dangers of not following manufacturer's instructions), cert. denied, 394 So. 2d 615
(La. 1980). At least 20-25% of all guns seized in crime had been stolen within the
previous 6 months. The Snub Nosed Killers, supra note 6, at 29. Up to 225,000 guns
are stolen annually. Id. At least 60,000 are taken from consumers. Moore, Keeping
Handguns from Criminal Offenders, 455 Annals 92, 100 (May 1981).
87. Cf. Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1086 (D.C. 1976) (manufac-
turer of flammable adhesive liable for failure to provide specific instructions to
prevent foreseeable dangers); Davis v. Siloo Inc., 47 N.C. App. 237, 245-46, 267
S.E.2d 354, 359 (manufacturer of chemical solvent liable for failure to provide
adequate instructions for foreseeable uses), cert. denied, 301 N.C. 234, 283 S.E.2d
131 (1980). Approximately 2400 deaths resulted from firearms accidents annually
between 1957 and 1967. Staff Report, supra note 8, at 26. Handgun accidents are
more likely to occur while the handgun is being misused, while "long gun" accidents
are more likely to occur during hunting or target shooting. Id. at 30-31.
88. Brizendine v. Visador Co., 305 F. Supp. 157, 160 (D. Or. 1969), aff'd, 437
F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1970); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 385, 348 N.E.2d
571, 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121 (1976); see First Nat'l Bank v. Nor-Am Agricultural
Prods., Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 87, 537 P.2d 682, 695 (1975).
89. James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negli-
gence?, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 923, 925 (1957).
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failure of these middlemen may not relieve the manufacturer's liabil-
ity.90
In order to warn and instruct adequately, a handgun manufacturer
should make reasonable efforts to learn of the principal sources of
guns used in crime and the logistical methods of preventing these guns
from reaching criminals. 91 It should also make reasonable efforts to
bring this knowledge to the attention of the dealer.9 2
It might be argued that because the risk that handguns may be
criminally misused is patent, the manufacturer has no duty to warn or
instruct dealers or consumers. 93 However, the patent/latent distinc-
tion as a limitation on liability has been rejected by many courts.9 4 It
90. See Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 69, 507 P.2d 653, 664, 107
Cal. Rptr. 45, 56 (1973); Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 72 Ill. App. 3d 540, 566-67,
390 N.E.2d 1214, 1233 (1979).
91. Cf. Baker v. Saint Agnes Hosp., 70 A.D.2d 400, 406, 421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 85
(1979) (drug manufacturer must keep abreast of knowledge pertaining to product
and bring that knowledge to the medical profession); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceu-
tical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 386, 528 P.2d 522, 528 (1974) (same).
92. The adequacy of efforts to warn and instruct is a question of fact, Stevens v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 66, 507 P.2d 653, 662, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 54
(1973); Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 72 Ill. App. 3d 540, 562, 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1230
(1979), and depends not only on the method but on the "intensity" with which the
manufacturer disseminates the information. Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio St.
2d 192, 198, 423 N.E.2d 831, 837 (1981); accord Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v.
Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1137 (9th Cir. 1977); Yarrow v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 163 (D.S.D. 1967), aff'd, 408 F.2d 978 (8th
Cir. 1969). Advertising and promotional techniques intended to increase the number
of buyers may erode a previously adequate warning. See Stevens v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65, 507 P.2d 653, 661, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 53 (1973); Incollingo v.
Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 288-89, 282 A.2d 206, 220 (1971). In analogous cases, drug
manufacturers have been held liable on a theory of inadequate warnings when
subsequent promotion failed to reinforce a printed warning packaged with the
product. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65, 507 P.2d 653, 661, 107
Cal. Rptr. 45, 53 (1973); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 288-89, 282 A.2d 206,
220 (1971). Hence, handgun manufacturers' efforts to warn should increase as the
scope and intensity of their promotional efforts increase. If the manufacturer has
reason to know the dealer will not provide necessary warnings and instructions, it
should also make reasonable efforts to bring its knowledge of the dangers to the
attention of the consumer. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 comment n
(1965); cf. Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 812-13 (9th Cir.
1974) (warning to plaintiff's employer not sufficient because duty is owed to ultimate
user); Doss v. Apache Powder Co., 430 F.2d 1317, 1321 (5th Cir. 1970) (warning to
supplier by dynamite manufacturer may not be sufficient if article is inherently
dangerous); Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 433, 581 P.2d 271, 278 (1978)
(warning to dealer by manufacturer of explosive liquid not sufficient to fulfill duty).
93. Cf. Hartman v. Miller Hydro Co., 499 F.2d 191, 194 (10th Cir. 1974) (expert
cannot recover for injuries caused by dangerous plant machinery because danger was
obvious); Poland v. Beaird-Poulan, 483 F. Supp. 1256, 1264 (W.D. La. 1980)
(plaintiff denied recovery because danger of chain saw is obvious).
94. E.g., Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167, 1172 (Fla. 1979);
Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 385, 348 N.E.2d 571, 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115,
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would be incongruous to hold a manufacturer liable for a latent defect
while exonerating one that failed to provide warnings, even though
fully aware of the danger, simply because the defect was patent.95
b. Negligent Entrustment
Even when warnings and instructions are objectively viewed as
adequate, if a manufacturer has reason to know that they are being
ignored" or are not effective in reducing the risk of a product's
misuse,97 the warnings and instructions should not be considered suffi-
cient to relieve liability. Therefore, a handgun manufacturer may be
considered to have acted unreasonably if it markets its product to
dealers it has reason to know fail to take adequate precautions to
reduce the risk of criminal misuse.
This doctrine of negligent entrustment is well illustrated in Moning
v. Alfono.9 8 In that case, the plaintiff was injured when a playmate
accidentally hit him with a pellet fired from a slingshot.9 9 In reversing
a directed verdict for the manufacturer, the court concluded that the
defendant could be found negligent for selling slingshots to children'00
because the child's misuse was foreseeable.' 10 Consequently, market-
ing a dangerous product without attempting to reduce the product's
availability to classes of purchasers likely to misuse the product could
be considered unreasonable. 102
120-21 (1976). See generally Darling, The Patent Danger Rule: An Analysis and A
Survey of its Vitality, 29 Mercer L. Rev. 583, 606-09 (1978).
95. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 145, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr.
443, 449 (1972); see Cobb v. Insured Lloyds, 387 So. 2d 13 (La. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 394 So. 2d 615 (La. 1980). The court in Cobb held the manufacturer liable
for injuries when a revolver misfired because the safety device was not in the proper
position. Plaintiff was familiar with similar weapons but did not realize, even though
defendant's instructions were quite specific, that this gun's safety mechanism was
unusual. The manufacturer was held to have failed in his duty because he had not
explicitly warned of the dangers of not following the instructions. Id. at 19.
96. Doss v. Apache Powder Co., 430 F.2d 1317, 1321 (5th Cir. 1970); Incollingo
v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 292, 282 A.2d 206, 222 (1971).
97. Cf. Doss v. Apache Powder Co., 430 F.2d 1317, 1321 (5th Cir. 1970)
(dynamite manufacturer may be liable if it does not know whether dealer will pass
warning on to potential user); Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 433-34, 581
P.2d 271, 278-79 (Ct. App. 1978) (manufacturer of explosive liquid may be liable if
he does not know whether dealer will pass warning on to potential user); Incollingo
v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 292, 282 A.2d 206, 222 (1971) (drug manufacturer who knew
product was prescribed indiscriminately liable despite warning).
98. 400 Mich. 425, 443-46, 254 N.W.2d 759, 767-69 (1977).
99. Id. at 432, 254 N.W.2d at 762.
100. Id. at 458, 254 N.W.2d at 774-75.
101. Id. at 441-42, 254 N.W.2d at 766.
102. Id. at 446-49, 254 N.W.2d at 769-70.
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Similarly, handgun manufacturers should foresee that mere dealer
compliance with statutory duties may not eliminate all risks of crimi-
nal misuse resulting from the manufacturers' current marketing pro-
cedures because such compliance does not suggest that the dealer has
taken all reasonable precautions. For example, in the absence of
suspicious circumstances, handgun dealers are not required by statute
to determine the authenticity of documents presented or to verify a
purchaser's true identity. 0 3 As a result, dealers may be unaware that a
purchaser is a member of a proscribed class, and many guns are sold
directly to persons proscribed by gun control laws. 10 4 Particularly
because existing statutes are ineffective in preventing these sales, 0 5 a
dealer should be liable in negligence for injuries resulting from guns
placed in the hands of ineligible purchasers. For example, it might be
considered unreasonable for a dealer to sell a handgun without requir-
ing corroboration of the purchaser's identity and eligibility. 10  Fur-
ther, a breach of the manufacturer's duty to market its product safely
may be established if it sells handguns to a dealer without requiring
that the dealer seek such corroboration.107
If a manufacturer has reason to know that a specific dealer has a
history of sales to ineligible persons, or that an undue percentage of
103. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1), (d) (1976).
104. Moore, supra note 86, at 97 (1981) (estimates of guns sold by the "federally
licensed [retail] sector" to proscribed persons range from 9000-90,000). Evidence
suggests that some dealers even aid prospective purchasers to circumvent prohibitory
statutes. Hearings on Saturday Night Specials, supra note 7, at 179-80 (testimony of
Albert Seedman, Chief of Detectives, New York City).
105. See Hearings on Saturday Night Specials, supra note 7, at 174 (statement of
Patrick Murphy, Police Commissioner, New York City); The District's Handgun
Ban, supra note 11, at 7.
106. See Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 593 F.2d 526, 530 (3d Cir. 1979)
(failure to comply with statute requiring handgun purchasers to be identified prior to
purchase was negligence per se); cf. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Abdullah,
94 Cal. App. 3d 81, 94, 156 Cal. Rptr. 254, 262 (1979) (automobile dealer is liable if
he fails to ascertain prospective purchaser's ability to drive before allowing test
drive).
There are a great number of private handgun sales among individuals. Moore,
supra note 86, at 98 (300,000 to 700,000 per year). However, most states do not
impose a statutory duty to report private transfers. But see Miss. Code Ann. § 45-9-17
(1972) (requiring anyone receiving a firearm to register the gun). The Kennedy-
Rodino Amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968, by requiring that all private
handgun sales take place through a licensed dealer, S. 511, § 103(a), 98th Cong., 1st
Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. S1317 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1983), would make it possible to trace
the weapon to the individual seller.
107. Cf. Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 593 F.2d 526, 530 (3d Cir. 1979)
(dealer liable for failure to obtain required corroborating proof); Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co. v. Abdullah, 94 Cal. App. 3d 81, 94, 156 Cal. Rptr. 254, 262 (1979)
(automobile dealer liable if he fails to ascertain prospective purchaser's ability to
drive before allowing test drive).
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handguns sold by that dealer have been used in crime, it should be
liable for continuing to entrust handguns to that dealer. 108 At present,
manufacturers concededly cannot determine with certainty whether
dealers have made reasonable efforts to screen prospective purchasers.
Records of handguns used in crime include only those reported to the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) as a result of statisti-
cal studies 09 or requests by local law enforcement officials for firearm
traces.110 Consequently, the use of this standard would depend upon
the enactment of legislation requiring that the serial numbers of all
guns used in crimes be reported to ATF to be compiled in a permanent
public record."' This will aid ATF to channel more effectively its
limited resources, and allow a manufacturer to identify those dealers
that pose an unreasonable risk due to a pattern of sales of guns used in
crime.
Another possible theory of negligent entrustment would be based on
a handgun manufacturer's duty to make reasonable efforts to prevent
handgun thefts from shippers and dealers. Of all firearm thefts, a
significant source of guns used in crime," 2 nearly thirty percent are
taken from these intermediaries." 3 A manufacturer should require
that anyone to whom he entrusts his handguns take adequate precau-
tions to prevent theft. Regulations should be promulgated that would
require that firearm thefts also be reported to ATF.1 4 This again will
108. Cf. Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 292, 282 A.2d 206, 222 (1971) (drug
manufacturer that knows product is being prescribed indiscriminately may be lia-
ble).
109. See Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Project Identification, A Study
of Handguns Used in Crime (1976), reprinted in Hearings on Handgun Violence,
supra note 7, at 355-419.
110. Treasury's Proposed Gun Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, 23 (1978)
(testimony of Richard Davis, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury).
111. The need for more extensive records concerning the sources of handguns and
how criminals gain access to these weapons has been recognized. See id. at 18-25
(statement of Richard Davis, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury). The system for
compiling such records is available. See generally Speech by Rex Davis, Director,
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, before the New York State Association of
Chiefs of Police Conference, July 29, 1975, in Buffalo, N.Y., reprinted in Hearings
on Handgun Violence, supra note 7, at 262-68 (describing the operations of the
current firearms tracing center).
112. See supra note 86.
113. Hearings on Handgun Violence, supra note 7, at 241 (testimony of David
McDonald, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury) (4 % are taken from interstate ship-
ments, 25% are taken from dealers, and 70% are taken from individuals and
miscellaneous sources). For a discussion of the possibility of firearm owners' liability
for injuries caused by stolen guns, see Fields, Guns, Crime, and the Negligent Gun
Owner, 10 N. Ky. L. Rev. 141 (1982).
114. A regulation requiring all federal firearm licensees to report thefts within
seven days was proposed in 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 11,800 (1978). The regulation was
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provide ATF with information necessary to direct its enforcement
efforts as well as provide the manufacturer with a public record of
those shippers and dealers who represent an unreasonable risk. A
manufacturer would then have reason to know of previous thefts from
a particular shipper or dealer and should be liable if it continues to
entrust its handguns to a shipper or dealer from which an undue
percentage of guns have been stolen.' 5
c. Saturday Night Specials
A design defect may be established by showing that an entire prod-
uct line is unreasonably dangerous." 6 A plaintiff may be able to
demonstrate that one particular line of handguns, frequently referred
to as Saturday Night Specials,1 7 is unreasonably dangerous by show-
ing that the risks of criminal use resulting from the design outweigh
the benefits of continued availability of these guns.",
Congress has recognized the grave risks posed by Saturday Night
Specials. 19 At present, the Gun Control Act of 1968 prohibits the
importation of Saturday Night Specials from foreign countries. 120 A
withdrawn in response to adverse congressional and public reaction but remained
under study. 44 Fed. Reg. 11,795 (1979).
115. Cf. Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 441-42, 254 N.W.2d 759, 765-66
(1977) (slingshot manufacturer liable for misuse because misuse is a foreseeable risk);
Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 292, 282 A.2d 206, 222 (1971) (drug manufacturer
who knows product is being used indiscriminately will be liable).
116. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429, 573 P.2d 443, 454,
143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 (1978); Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 77 111. 2d 434, 437, 396
N.E.2d 534, 535-36 (1979); Azzarello v. Black Bros., 480 Pa. 547, 559, 391 A.2d
1020, 1027 (1978). See generally 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 58,
§ 16A[4][f][iv][D].
117. These weapons are generally described as easily concealable, inexpensive and
poorly made. Hearings on Saturday Night Specials, supra note 7, at 132 (testimony of
Eugene T. Rossides, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury); id. at 281 (testimony of
John Nichols, Commissioner of Police, Detroit); id. at 330-31 (testimony of Harold
A. Serr, Retired Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms); Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Project Identification, A Study of Handguns Used in
Crime (1976), reprinted in Hearings on Handgun Violence, supra note 7, at 366-67.
118. Cf. Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 957 (3d Cir. 1980) (automobile
design unreasonable if risks outweigh benefits), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981);
Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 45 (Alaska 1979) (if risks of handgun design
far outweigh its benefits, plaintiff would be entitled to directed verdict), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
119. See 127 Cong. Rec. S3807 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1981) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy). See generally Hearings on Saturday Night Specials, supra note 7.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 925(d)(3) (1976) (prohibiting importation of any firearm that is
not "particularly suitable for or readily adaptable to sporting purposes" or limited
other purposes). Although the statute does not specifically refer to "Saturday Night
Specials," the statutory language has been interpreted as referring to these guns. See,
e.g., 127 Cong. Rec. S3807 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1981) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
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loophole in the statute, however, allows the importation of parts for
these handguns from overseas for assembly and sale in the United
States.12 ' Subsequent congressional proposals have sought both to close
this loophole and to eliminate the risks inherent in continued avail-
ability of Saturday Night Specials by banning their sale in the United
States.1 22
It has been suggested that Saturday Night Specials pose a great risk
of criminal misuse particularly because they are easily concealable
and relatively inexpensive. 2 3 Most Saturday Night Specials are, in
fact, used in crime. 124 In addition, any countervailing social usefulness
is negligible because the poor quality of their manufacture precludes
121. See Hearings on Saturday Night Specials, supra note 7, at 132 (testimony of
Eugene Rossides, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury); 127 Cong. Rec. S3807 (daily
ed. Apr. 9, 1981) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
122. See, e.g., S. 511, § 105, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. S1318 (daily
ed. Feb. 17, 1983) (empowering Attorney General to prevent sale of weapons not
"readily adaptable to sporting purposes"). A legislative ban of Saturday Night Spe-
cials was passed by the Senate in 1972, S. 2507, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 Cong. Rec.
27,502 (1972), but was not approved by the House of Representatives. (The bill was
reported to the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, 118 Cong.
Rec. 27,713 (1972), but was not passed during the 92d Congress.) The primary
objection raised in the Senate hearings was the broad discretionary power the bill
granted the Secretary of the Treasury to prevent the sale of handguns unsuitable for
sporting uses. See Hearings on Saturday Night Specials, supra note 7, at 316 (state-
ment of Maxwell Rich, Executive Vice President, National Rifle Association); Na-
tional Rifle Association Press Release, supra note 55, at 7. By contrast, a court does
not have similar discretion in determining if a particular handgun may be classified
as a Saturday Night Special. Its determination is limited by the specific facts of a
particular case.
123. Hearings on Saturday Night Specials, supra note 7, at 330-31 (testimony of
Harold A. Serr, Retired Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms);
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Project Identification, A Study of Hand-
guns Used in Crime (1976), reprinted in Hearings on Handgun Violence, supra note
7, at 366-67. This theory is central to the Brady case. First Amended Complaint for
Damages, Brady v. Hinckley, No. 82-0549, at 4-10 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 1982).
124. 127 Cong. Rec. S3807, 3808 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1981) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy). These guns account for a large percentage of handguns used in crime.
Hearings on Saturday Night Specials, supra note 7, at 181 (remarks of Chairman
Birch Bayh) (interpreting FBI statistics to suggest that 43 % of all handgun murders
are committed with Saturday Night Specials); id. at 263 (testimony of Donald E.
Santarelli, Associate Deputy Attorney General) (District of Columbia, 1/1/71-
8/14/71: of all handguns recovered in crime, 54 % were Saturday Night Specials); id.
at 281 (testimony of John Nichols, Commissioner of Police, Detroit, Michigan)
(Detroit, 1968-1971: of all handguns recovered in crime, 29.7% to 36.1% were
Saturday Night Specials); id. at 344 (testimony of Joseph P. Busch, District Attorney
of Los Angeles County) (Los Angeles: of all guns seized in crime and destroyed in July
1971, 37% were Saturday Night Specials).
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their use for most legitimate purposes. 125 Other guns are safer 1 26 and
more accurate12 7 for legitimate uses, 28 while not posing the same
danger of criminal misuse. 29 Accordingly, courts should impose lia-
bility on manufacturers of Saturday Night Specials for injuries that
result from use of these guns because such guns are defectively de-
signed and thus pose an unreasonable risk of harm to the public.' 30
B. Cause
To establish liability, the breach of the manufacturer's duty must
be shown to be both the cause in fact and proximate cause of the
injury. '31 Causation in fact is established by showing that the manu-
125. Hearings on Saturday Night Specials, supra note 7, at 132 (testimony of
Eugene T. Rossides, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury); id. at 109 (testimony of
Jerry Wilson, Chief of Police, Washington, D.C.); see 127 Cong. Rec. S3807 (daily
ed. Apr. 9, 1981) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
126. Because Saturday Night Specials are by definition inexpensive and poorly
made, they are more likely to malfunction and cause harm to the user. See Hearings
on Saturday Night Specials, supra note 7, at 155-58 (testimony of D.R. Dunn,
Manager, H.P. White Laboratory).
127. 127 Cong. Rec. S3807, 3808 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1981) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy).
128. Although many handgun owners cite self-defense as the primary purpose for
possessing handguns, few American adults have actually fired a weapon in self-
defense. Wright, supra note 80, at 30-31. Available evidence also suggests that the
protection afforded by handguns is largely illusory and is offset by increased acci-
dents and illegal use. Staff Report, supra note 8, at 68; see Hearings on Handgun
Violence, supra note 7, at 809 (testimony of Milton Eisenhower, Former Chairman
of the President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence). But see
National Rifle Association Press Release, supra note 55, at 8.
129. Handguns account for only about 25% of all firearms owned in the United
States. Fields, supra note 8, at 38; Staff Report, supra note 8, at 7. Saturday Night
Specials, while constituting only about 12% of handguns owned by law-abiding
citizens, account for 68 % of the handguns used by criminals. 127 Cong. Rec. S3808
(daily ed. Apr. 9, 1981) (citing study made by Florida Bureau of Criminal Justice
Planning and Assistance).
130. See Hearings on Saturday Night Specials, supra note 7, at 109 (statement of
Jerry Wilson, Chief of Police, Washington, D.C.); 127 Cong. Rec. S3807 (daily ed.
Apr. 9, 1981) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); First Amended Complaint for Damages,
Brady v. Hinckley, No. 82-0549, at 4-6 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 1982).
It has been suggested that if these guns become more difficult to obtain criminals
will merely shift to other, more expensive guns. Institute for Legislative Action,
National Rifle Ass'n, The Myth of the "Saturday Night Special" (1979) (information
pamphlet). However, this ignores the fact that as the cost of committing a crime
rises, the relative return becomes less, offering a disincentive to criminal activity. See
W. Luksetich & M. White, Crime and Public Policy: An Economic Approach 83-84
(1982).
131. See Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1981);
Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1354-55 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d
1335 (3d Cir. 1979); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 69, 507 P.2d 653,
664, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 56 (1973). See generally 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra
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facturer's breach was a substantial cause of the injury. 132 Proximate
cause, rather than a question of actual causation, is a legal doctrine
intended to limit liability to those causes that bear sufficient relation
to the injury to warrant legal responsibility.1 33 Generally, a manufac-
turer's breach of a duty will be held to be the proximate cause of the
injury only if the injury is foreseeable. 34
1. Causation in Fact
Actual causation may be established by showing that a handgun
manufacturer's design or marketing was a substantial factor in bring-
ing about the criminal misuse that resulted in a plaintiff's injuries. 135
An inference of a causal relation is permissible if the act or omission
could reasonably be expected to produce a particular result and that
result, in fact, occurred. 136 Even if the injury has been caused by a
combination of acts or omissions by the dealer and the manufacturer,
neither party should be absolved merely because the other contributed
to the result. 137
note 58, §§ 11.01-.02; W. Prosser, supra note 1, §§ 41-42; Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 431 (1965).
132. E.g., Clark v. Leisure Vehicles, Inc., 96 Wis. 2d 607, 617, 292 N.W.2d 630,
635 (1980); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967); see 1
L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 58, § 11.01; W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 41, at
240-41; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 (1965).
133. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 41, at 236-37; see Klages v. General Ordinance
Equip. Corp., 240 Pa. Super. 356, 373, 367 A.2d 304, 313 (1976); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 431(b) (1965).
134. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 363 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 69, 507 P.2d 653, 664, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 45, 56 (1973); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 159,
406 A.2d 140, 144 (1979); Bailey v. Boatand of Houston, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 805, 811
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980); 1 L.
Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 58, § 11.02; W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 43, at
267.
135. Cf. Klages v. General Ordinance Equip. Corp., 240 Pa. Super. 356, 373, 367
A.2d 304, 313 (1976) (failure of mace weapon to defend against a criminal attack is a
substantial cause of resulting injuries); Clark v. Leisure Vehicles, Inc., 96 Wis. 2d
607, 617, 292 N.W.2d 630, 635 (1980) (defective snowmobile design is a cause of
resulting injury if it is a "substantial factor"); Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580
P.2d 1123, 1130 (Wyo. 1978) (if two parties are negligent for injuries resulting from
automobile collision, each will be liable if his conduct "was a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm"). Today, most courts apply the substantial cause test
instead of the more familiar "but for" test. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 41, at 240-41;
see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431(a) (1965).
136. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 41, at 242.
137. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 41, at 239, 240-41; cf. Chrysler Corp. v. To-
dorovich, 580 P.2d 1123, 1130 (Wyo. 1978) (if two parties combine to bring about
harm, each will be liable if his conduct was a substantial cause of the injury); Cobb
v. Insured Lloyds, 387 So. 2d 13, 19 (La. Ct. App.) (manufacturer will be liable for
failure to warn despite the user's negligence), cert. denied, 394 So. 2d 615 (La. 1980).
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A plaintiff may show a causal relation between the injury resulting
from the criminal misuse of a handgun and the manufacturer's failure
to warn and instruct the dealer adequately by establishing that: 1) the
manufacturer failed to warn and instruct the dealer as to reasonable
precautions to prevent thefts or sales to unfit persons; 2) the dealer
failed to take adequate precautions to prevent these sales or thefts;
and 3) the gun used in the crime was, in fact, obtained as a result of
the dealer's failure. 138
Similarly, a plaintiff may show a causal relation between an injury
resulting from criminal handgun misuse and the handgun manufac-
turer's negligent entrustment of his product to another, if he estab-
lishes that: 1) the manufacturer entrusted its handguns to a dealer but
failed to require that dealer to take reasonable precautions to prevent
theft or sales to unfit persons; 2) the dealer failed to guard against
handgun theft or sales to unfit persons; and 3) the gun used in the
crime was, in fact, obtained as a result of that dealer's failure. 3
Alternatively, a plaintiff may show a causal relation by establishing
that the manufacturer had reason to know that entrusting its hand-
guns to a particular dealer posed an unreasonable risk of criminal
misuse either because: 1) of a history of thefts from, or sales to unfit
persons by the dealer; or 2) an undue percentage of handguns en-
trusted to that dealer had, in fact, been used in crime, 40 and the
plaintiffs injuries were caused by a handgun obtained from that
dealer.
Finally, a plaintiff may show a causal relation between the manu-
facturer's sales of Saturday Night Specials and injury resulting from
the criminal misuse of these guns by establishing that had the manu-
138. Cf. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 69, 507 P.2d 653, 664, 107
Cal. Rptr. 45, 56 (1973) (drug manufacturer's failure to warn is legal cause of
resulting injury despite doctor's intervening negligence); Cobb v. Insured Lloyds, 387
So. 2d 13, 19 (La. Ct. App.) (manufacturer's failure to warn and instruct is a
proximate cause of resulting injuries), cert. denied, 394 So. 2d 615 (La. 1980).
139. Cf. Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 593 F.2d 526, 530-31 (3d Cir. 1979)
(compliance with Delaware statute requiring identification of handgun purchaser
would have prevented consummation of this particular sale; causation found);
Franco v. Bunyard, 261 Ark. 144, 147, 547 S.W.2d 91, 93 (if federal law had been
obeyed, criminal would not have obtained possession of the gun; causation found),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977); Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 441-42, 254
N.W.2d 759, 766 (1977) (children's misuse of slingshot was a normal consequence of
manufacturer's marketing; causation found).
140. Cf. Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 593 F.2d 526, 530-31 (3d Cir. 1979)
(failure to take reasonable precautions and failure to comply with statute may make
dealer liable for entrusting handgun to one likely to misuse it); Franco v. Bunyard,
261 Ark. 144, 147, 547 S.W.2d 91, 93 (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977);
Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 447-49, 254 N.W.2d 759, 769-70 (1977) (manufac-
turer may be liable for entrusting slingshots to children, a class likely to misuse
them).
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facturer acted reasonably, a Saturday Night Special would not have
been available and thus would not have caused the injury.14 '
2. Proximate Cause
Perhaps the most problematic issue in finding the manufacturer
liable for criminal misuse of handguns is establishing that the manu-
facturer's design or marketing was the proximate cause of the in-
jury.14 2 If handgun misuse is foreseeable, the manufacturer will be
held liable for injuries resulting from that misuse 43 even though the
gun would have been safe if used as the manufacturer intended. 144
Foreseeability refers to the general risk of misuse created by unreason-
able marketing or design rather than to specific intervening acts. 45
Therefore, the manufacturer need not foresee the specific chain of
events that leads to criminal misuse in order to be liable. 46 Neverthe-
141. Cf. Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 593 F.2d 526, 530-31 (3d Cir. 1979)
(compliance with statute would have kept dealer's gun from criminal and dealer's
gun would not have otherwise caused injury); Franco v. Bunyard, 261 Ark. 144, 147,
547 S.W.2d 91, 93 (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977).
142. See Bennet v. Cincinnati Checker Cab Co., 353 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (E.D.
Ky. 1973); Motion to Dismiss, Statement of Points and Authorities, Brady v. Hinck-
ley, No. 82-0549, at 16 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 1982); cf. Gillot v. Washington Metropoli-
tan Area Transit Auth., 507 F. Supp. 454, 457 (D.D.C. 1981) (defendant parking lot
operator not liable for rape of customer, even though his negligence afforded the
opportunity, because intervening criminal act is a superseding cause); Olson v.
Ratzel, 89 Wis. 2d 227, 253-54, 278 N.W.2d 238, 250-51 (Ct. App. 1979) (public
policy may relieve handgun dealer of liability even if plaintiff would otherwise be
entitled to recovery for common-law negligence).
143. Cf. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 363
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (dynamite manufacturer liable for foreseeable misuse); Stevens v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 69, 507 P.2d 653, 664, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 56 (1973)
(drug manufacturer liable for foreseeable misuse); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry &
Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 159, 406 A.2d 140, 144 (1979) (machine manufacturer liable
for foreseeable misuse); Bailey v. Boatland of Houston, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 805, 811
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (boat manufacturer liable for foreseeable misuse), rev'd on
other grounds, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
144. For example, an automobile manufacturer is required to design his cars to be
reasonably safe in accidents because accidents are foreseeable even though not in-
tended. See, e.g., Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir.
1981); Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 956 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 959 (1981); Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1276 (8th
Cir. 1972); Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1355 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd mem.,
591 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1979); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal, 2d 121, 126, 501
P.2d 1153, 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 437 (1972).
145. See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 362
(E.D.N.Y. 1972); Franco v. Bunyard, 261 Ark. 144, 147, 547 S.W.2d 91, 93, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977); Palmisano v. Ehrig, 171 N.J. Super. 310, 313-14, 408
A.2d 1083, 1084-85 (App. Div. 1979); W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 43, at 268-69.
146. Cf. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 362
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (blasting cap manufacturer's failure to warn was proximate cause of
injuries to children because accidents that resulted were within the "general kind or
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less, a plaintiff must convince a court that both the criminal act 147 and
the dealer's negligence 148 are not superseding acts that relieve the
manufacturer of responsibility and liability.
The intervention of the dealer's negligent act and the criminal
misuse should be foreseen 49 because "the defendant's duty requires
him to anticipate the intervening misconduct, and guard against
it." 15 0 The handgun manufacturers' duties suggested in the previous
sections' 5' are predicated on the expectation that the manufacturer
should foresee both the likelihood that dealers will fail to guard ade-
quately against unfit persons obtaining handguns and the possibility
that unfit persons will purchase guns or that guns will be stolen.152
Therefore, a breach of these duties may be considered the proximate
cause of resulting injuries.
type of [foreseeable] risk"); Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 441-42, 254 N.W.2d
759, 766 (1977) (injury caused by slingshot need only be within "the recognizable risk
of harm"). See generally W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 44, at 268-69; Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 449 (1965).
147. Cf. Gillot v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 507 F. Supp.
454, 457 (D.D.C. 1981) (defendant parking lot operator not liable for rape of
customer because intervening criminal act is superseding); Bennet v. Cincinnati
Checker Cab Co., 353 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (E.D. Ky. 1973) (importer not liable
because criminal handgun misuse is superseding); Franco v. Bunyard, 261 Ark. 144,
147, 547 S.W.2d 91, 93 (handgun dealer liable for injuries because criminal misuse
was foreseeable), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977); Olson v. Ratzel, 89 Wis. 2d 227,
254, 278 N.W.2d 238, 250-51 (Ct. App. 1979) (suggesting that trial court may find
criminal misuse of a handgun to be a superseding cause).
148. Cf. Di Gironimo v. American Seed Co., 96 F. Supp. 795, 796-97 (E.D. Pa.
1951) (when minor was sold a gun in contravention of statute and loaned it to a third
party who negligently caused injury to the plaintiff, the dealer is liable if the loan
was foreseeable); Spires v. Goldberg, 26 Ga. App. 530, 537-38, 106 S.E. 585, 587-88
(1921) (same); Wassel v. Ludwig, 92 Pa. Super. 341, 347 (1928) (same). This is
merely an extension of the general principle that even unusual risks that can be
foreseen are the responsibility of the actor. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B
(1965).
149. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 44, at 272 (the intervening act is foreseeable if it
"is a significant part of the risk involved in the defendant's conduct, or is so reason-
ably connected with it that the responsibility should not be terminated").
150. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 44, at 275.
151. See supra pt. I(A)(2).
152. The dealer's negligence is not a necessary link in the chain of causation if the
handgun that was criminally misused was a Saturday Night Special. These guns are
more likely to be used by criminals than by law-abiding citizens. 127 Cong Rec.
S3808 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1981) (citing study conducted by Florida Bureau of Criminal
Justice Planning and Assistance). Therefore, the mere act of making this weapon
available makes the criminal act foreseeable. Cf. Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 593 F.2d 526, 531 (3d Cir. 1979) (violation of a statute that is designed to
prevent criminal misuse makes criminal misuse foreseeable); Franco v. Bunyard, 261
Ark. 144, 147, 547 S.W.2d 91, 93, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977).
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III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Strict products liability law developed for two principal reasons:
1) to spread the risk of loss while compensating the victim; 153 and 2)
to provide incentives for increasing product safety. 154 The law focuses
on the manufacturer because it is in the best position both to discover
and to remedy defects. 155 The manufacturer's view of the industry is
necessarily broader than that of the individual retailer; only it can
address an industry-wide problem. 56
Generally, the handgun manufacturer can best afford to compen-
sate the victims of criminal misuse of handguns because it is in the best
position to spread the costs of injuries. 157 Of course, if the burden of
payment is transferred from the victim to the manufacturer, the cost
of handguns will rise, and handgun purchasers, those who derive the
benefit of handgun availability, will ultimately bear the cost. 58
The second policy thrust of products liability law demands that the
handgun manufacturers bear the costs of criminal misuse of handguns
that could have been avoided by taking reasonable precautions,
thereby offering them an incentive to take the reasonable steps re-
quired. 59 By contrast, the victim is not voluntarily involved in the
enterprise and could not be expected to guard against its risks.160
153. E.g., Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368
(E.D.N.Y. 1972); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 173-74,
406 A.2d 140, 151-52 (1979); Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 255-56, 201 N.W.2d
825, 829 (1972); Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for
Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69, 73 (1975); Davison, supra note 73, at 645;
Katz, supra note 70, at 662; Wade, supra note 61, at 826. But see Posner, A Theory
of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29, 33-34 (1972) (efficiency, not compensation, is the
goal of tort law).
154. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d
436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); First Nat'l Bank v. Nor-Am Agricul-
tural Prods., Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 87, 537 P.2d 682, 695 (Ct. App. 1975); Calabresi,
supra note 153, at 77-78, 84; Davison, supra note 73, at 645; Katz, supra note 70, at
662; Wade, supra note 61, at 826.
155. See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368
(E.D.N.Y. 1972); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d
436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); James, supra note 89, at 925.
156. See James, supra note 89, at 925.
157. See Azzarello v. Black Bros., 480 Pa. 547, 553, 391 A.2d 1020, 1023 (1978);
Wade, supra note 61, at 826.
158. See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368-69
(E.D.N.Y. 1972); Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 255, 201 N.W.2d 825, 829
(1972) (quoting Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 450, 155 N.W.2d 55, 58 (1967));
Davison, supra note 73, at 645; Wade, supra note 61, at 826.
159. See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368
(E.D.N.Y. 1972); First Nat'l Bank v. Nor-Am Agricultural Prods., Inc., 88 N.M. 74,
87, 537 P.2d 682, 695 (Ct. App. 1975); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485,
503, 525 P.2d 1033, 1041 (1974); Cook & Blose, supra note 30, at 90. See generally
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring); Calabresi, supra note 153, at 78, 84.
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It might be suggested that attempting to reduce the availability of
handguns to criminals is a legislative function. 161 Certainly, the legis-
lature is an appropriate forum for addressing this problem.16 2 Never-
theless, the controversy surrounding this issue intensifies the usual
difficulties of legislative action. 163 Furthermore, the investment of
time and money necessary to enact legislation is often wasted because
the legislation is ultimately rejected as a result of objections to periph-
eral issues164 or obstruction by special interest groups.16 5
The principal advantage of risk and resource allocation through
tort law is that the costs are borne not by the taxpayers but rather by
those who derive benefits from the handgun industry. 6 6 Courts
merely determine who is to bear the risk and industry then follows the
dictates of the marketplace in determining how best to spread that
risk. 6 7 Of course, the handgun manufacturer may choose not to
change its unreasonable design and marketing and simply spread the
cost of litigation or insurance by raising the price of its product. 6"
More likely, however, a handgun manufacturer will choose to fulfill
its common-law duty to provide products that are reasonably safe so
as to avoid the possibility of large personal injury judgments.'
160. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962); James, supra note 89, at 923; Wade, supra note
61, at 826.
161. Cf. Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 930, 933, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 483, 484 (1976) (held that imposing tort liability on slingshot manufacturer for
marketing to children usurps a legislative function). But cf. Moning v. Alfono, 400
Mich. 425, 434, 254 N.W.2d 754, 763 (1977) (held that imposing tort liability on
slingshot manufacturer for marketing to children does not usurp a legislative func-
tion).
162. See Hearings on Firearms Legislation [Part 1], supra note 55, at 2 (statement
of Chairman Conyers).
163. Cf. J. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy: The Administrative Process and
American Government 93-94 (1978) ("hotly controverted issues" may result in no
legislation because "[s]ometimes a nation has no will sufficiently focused or widely
shared to permit present expression through a majority"). See supra note 55.
164. See W. Keefe & M. Ogul, The American Legislative Process 453-55 (5th ed.
1981).
165. See Hearings on Firearms Legislation [Part 1], supra note 55, at 4 (opening
statement of Chairman Conyers); 127 Cong. Rec. S3806-07 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1981)
(remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
166. See Calabresi, Product Liability: Curse or Bulwark of Free Enterprise, 27
Clev. St. L. Rev. 313, 323-25 (1978).
167. Id. at 316-17.
168. See Posner, supra note 153, at 33.
169. Cf. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (explosives manufacturers); see also Bodine, 7-Figure Verdicts Hit
New High, 3 Nat'l L.J. 1, 1 (May 4, 1981) (pointing out the trend of large personal
injury judgments, particularly in product liability suits).
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CONCLUSION
The ultimate question in determining a breach of the handgun
manufacturer's duty is whether the design or marketing of its product
was unreasonably unsafe. The prevalence of handgun use in violent
crime and the ease with which criminals obtain those guns indicate
that some manufacturers have failed to make reasonable efforts to
reduce criminal misuse of handguns.
Conventional wisdom suggests that if "a gun maker would be liable
to anyone shot by the gun," he would be an insurer. 170 However, this
Note suggests that liability should be imposed only if the gun which
caused the injury would not have been available had the manufac-
turer fulfilled its duty to reasonably design and properly market its
product. The law should not immunize a handgun manufacturer from
liability if a breach of that duty results in injury. Nor should criminal
intervention supersede the manufacturer's liability. A manufacturer
should foresee the increased likelihood of criminal misuse resulting
from current unreasonable handgun marketing and design.
The fear of overstepping the bounds of judicial restraint and pre-
empting a legislative function is a legitimate judicial concern. None-
theless, it must be realized that "however [a] Court decides [a] case it
in effect makes a value judgment."' 7' Imposition of tort liability
merely forces the manufacturer to allocate the risks of handgun misuse
so that those who derive the benefit from handgun availability also
bear the cost.
H. Todd Iveson
170. Wade, supra note 61, at 828; cf. Traynor, supra note 74, at 367 (knife
manufacturer).
171. Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 435, 254 N.W.2d 759, 763 (1977).

